Introduction
In European countries with strong union coverage such as Germany, collectively bargained wages have traditionally been high and have gone hand-in-hand with substantial levels of structural unemployment. As wages are sticky in Germany, especially long-term unemployment is a large problem in the labor market. Indeed the German Hartz reforms 1 were intended to address this high level of unsustainable non-participation through long-term unemployment and reactivate the previously unemployed. Since the Global Financial Crisis of the late 2000s, most Western countries have had to deal with even higher levels of unemployment than had historically been experienced (Eurostat, 2013) . This unemployment has not been without substantial cost to the unemployed.
In general, the negative welfare impacts of entry into unemployment have been extensively studied in a life satisfaction framework as in Easterlin (1974) , Clark and Oswald (1996) or Senik (2005) and have been shown to be large and signicant. Clark and Oswald (1994) nd that the eect of unemployment is comparable to very negative life events, such as divorce. The study of Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) is of particular note, as the welfare loss of unemployment, even over and above any income loss, was shown to be substantial, using data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Variations and extensions of these results have been
conrmed by Clark (2003) and Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, and Diener (2004) for the UK and other countries. An extensive review of this strand of literature is to be found in Frey and Stutzer (2002) .
Substantially later, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) , also using data from the German SOEP, were able to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary entry into unemployment, using data not previously available at the time of the Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) study. The SOEP data allow one to identify entry into unemployment due to company closure and this can be considered to be exogenous and independent of individual worker traits. This exogenous entry can be compared to entry into unemployment through quitting, time-limited contracts running out and ring. The study demonstrates that the strongest negative impacts for the unemployed are suered by those whose entry into unemployment was caused by an exogenous company closure, and are particularly strong for one period of time (year), over and above a negative eect of being in the state of unemployment. The eects 1 The Hartz reforms took place in Germany between 2003 and 2005 . Addressing the problem of high unemployment rates, they introduced unbureaucratic ways of creating jobs, reorganized the work of public job centers and changed the assistance payments for long-term unemployed by combining it with welfare benets (see Wirtschaftslexikon, 2013) . are substantially stronger for women than for men, as women in the German labor market may not be as exible in nding new employment, taking family logistics into account.
This negative wellbeing impact might even exceed the individual level. In order to assess how the unemployment of a wage earner might have an indirect impact on other family members, such as children. Kind and Haisken-DeNew (2012) use panel data from the SOEP and control for the specic reason of parental entry into unemployment. The study focuses on children living with their parents in the same household and nds strong negative eects of the fathers' entry into unemployment on 17-25 year old sons living with at least one parent. The study concludes that parental exogenous entry into unemployment bears higher costs than previously assumed, due to intergenerational transmission.
Analogous to unemployment, the inability to use previously acquired labor market skills upon entry into a new job, as in the case of overeducation, may also produce negative welfare eects. The role of overeducation has been demonstrated in the economic literature and is well established, with many studies analyzing the earnings eects of overeducation (e.g. Sicherman, 1991; Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004; Bauer, 2002) . As most studies nd that overeducation inuences personal earnings negatively, it appears likely that other aspects of life can also be inuenced. Battu, Beleld, and Sloane (1999) have analyzed the eects of overeducation on job satisfaction and Korpi and Tahlin (2009) have found a negative eect of objective overeducation on job satisfaction. This study examines the role of underemployment through overeducation when employees move from job-to-job, bypassing unemployment, and start a new job in which they cannot fully utilize their previously acquired labor market skills. To derive causal eects, we rely on an econometric strategy focusing on job changers and differentiating between exogenous and potentially self-induced (endogenous) job changes (Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009 ). Not only do we use information on the reason for leaving the former job, but also after leaving the former job and getting a new one, respondents state whether they can use their professional skills to the same amount they could in their previous position. Combining this information allows us to obtain the causal eect of an exogenous move to a bad job match and comparing it to that of entering unemployment or remaining in a good job match.
Results show that moving jobs voluntarily has a signicant positive eect on respondents' life satisfaction, as long as they move to a good job match. If, however, people downchange, such that they cannot fully utilize their skills, the estimated wellbeing coecients are negative. The results for people moving jobs involuntarily are even more pronounced and show that not only does downchanging have a large negative causal eect on life satisfaction, but relatively speaking, this eect is more than half as large as the eect of becoming unemployed. The paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the data used, section 3 explains the empirical strategy. In section 4, the results of the empirical analysis are presented while the fth section summarizes and discusses the results.
Data
In performing the analysis, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is a large household panel carried out in Germany since 1984.
2
We use thirteen waves of observations starting in 1994 and ending in 2009. 3 We restrict our sample to the working age (18 to 65) and exclude the self-employed as their skill match follows a fundamentally dierent path. The dependent variable in this analysis is general life satisfaction, in which respondents are asked, "How satised are you with your life, all things considered?". This question is answered on an 11-point scale ranging from "completely dissatised" (0) to "completely satised" (10). The main explanatory variable is the variable downchange. For the denition of this variable, we use detailed information on the reasons for respondents leaving their jobs. People moving from one job to another are asked whether they can use their professional skills more, less or in a about the same way as in their previous position. This information is used to dene underemployed persons. In the economic literature, there has been a long and intense discussion about the operationalization of overeducation. Possible methods include: (a) an objective approach, (b) an empirical approach and (c) a subjective approach. The objective approach (e.g. Rumberger, 1987) uses an expert evaluation of educational requirements for a job. While this is available for the US (Dictionary of Occupational Titles), it does not exist for the German labor market. Furthermore, there is the structural weakness that it needs regular updates because otherwise the seemingly mismatched workers might indeed be in an appropriately matched position, once taking technological change into account (e.g. Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira, 1997) .
The second method is an empirical one comparing the educational endowment of an individual to the mean (e.g. Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989; Bauer, 2002) or modal (e.g. Kiker, Santos, and de Oliveira, 1997; Bauer, 2002) education in a given occupation. This method has the advantage of updating automatically with each new wave of data and has often been used in wage regressions. However, for this analysis, it does not capture the necessary information adequately. Wage regressions identify the earnings eect of being in a job that does not t one's own education. The exact reasons for choosing this imperfect t only play a minor role in this eld of literature. This analysis aims at explaining the eects of undereducation and the knowledge of the reason for choosing this state is a crucial prerequisite for the interpretation of causal eects.
We therefore rely on the third method discussed in the literature, which is a subjective approach. One way of operationalizing this approach is to ask respondents for the necessary education to do their job (Sicherman, 1991; Sloane, Battu, and Seaman, 1999) . This is already closer to the real perception of the job match of respondents. Nevertheless, it has the disadvantage that it remains unclear whether respondents answer with: (a) the mean level of education in their occupational position, (b) current hiring standards or (c) according to the real requirements of their tasks. It is also unknown whether respondents are aware of the standards in their occupation or if they answer according to observations in their company or industry (for a discussion of this approach, see Bauer, 2002) .
We mainly focus on the variable downchange, which allows the respondent to sum up many dierent inuences to arrive at a simple answer. To allow an easier integration into the overeducation literature, we also include an empirical measure of overeducation, comparing a respondent's educational endowment to the modal value of education in the occupation he works in. Including this in our regressions ensures that the eect we attribute to a downchange is not driven by objective overeducation. The control for objective overeducation remains insignicant in most regressions.
The second important feature of our data is information on the reason for leaving a job. The SOEP provides information on the reason a job was terminated. This includes the categories: (a) place of worked closed, (b) own resignation, (c) dismissal by the employer, (d) a mutual agreement, (e) the ending of a temporary contract, (f) entering retirement, (g) being on a leave of absence and (h) closing down the own business when self-employed. Of special interest for us is the rst reason, the company closure. For two reasons, this is exogenous to the respondent: First, no single employee is able to inuence this rm-wide outcome signicantly and second, it hits all employees, regardless of characteristics. Making use of this exogeneity, we are able to derive causal eects. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables used. A downchange, i.e. a change from one job to another while the professional skills are not fully utilized in the new job, is observed for nearly 2% of our sample. While this appears to be quite low on the rst glance, it still means more than 3,000 cases due to the large number of observations in the SOEP. Then, all job change variables are dened for the period immediately following the change, so respondents do not remain in this state longer than the one-period transition state. Hence, change-observations are individuals, not person-year observations. This means there is a profound amount of observations. There are two other stages one can arrive at after a job change. The rst of these is becoming unemployed, whilst the other is moving to a job that is a good match in terms of skill usage. These states are observed more often with 3.6% of the male sample (for women 3%) moving into unemployment and 10% moving into a skillmatch. The mean age in the sample is about 42 years (42.1 for men and 41.8) for females. On average, there are about 0.7 children per individual and a 70% of respondents are married. Mean education is around 12 years (12.1 for males and 11.8 for females) and there are no large dierences in the household income to be observed. It should be noted that we do not use the personal labor income, but rather the logarithm of net household income. We control for moving house, as it might be the case that people change jobs as they move with their partners and are therefore "forced" to move, personal health is measured with the objective variable of nights spent in hospital. Working hours dier most strongly between men and women, reecting typical dierences in the labor market. Males work on average 32 hours a week, females only 19 hours. This gives a rst hint at a higher importance of the labor market for men, which will play an important role in the interpretation of the results. Table 2 shows the share of job changers over the dierent possible outcomes. The overall largest group of changers consists of those people voluntarily leaving their jobs and moving on to new jobs with a good skill match. The group of changers due to external reasons only includes those individuals leaving their jobs due to a company closure, so they are naturally outnumbered by the persons changing for other reasons. Still, about 6.5% of all job changes in the male and 4% of all changes in the female sample happen after a company closure. As we can make use of the large number of observation in the SOEP, there are still enough observations for the following empirical analysis. 
Empirical Strategy
As the analysis uses a subjective dependent variable, the use of personal xed-eects is critical, accounting for person-specic, unobserved characteristics inuencing individual happiness. 4 In accordance with Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004), we run linear xed-eects regressions.
In addition to linear xed-eects regressions, we use a xed-eects logit estimator developed by Chamberlain (1980) . In order to apply this approach, the dependent variable is collapsed into a binary variable as a conditional maximum likelihood estimator is used. This approach is in line with Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004); Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) and Kind and Haisken-DeNew (2012) .
To collapse the satisfaction variable into a binary format, it is coded 0 if the reported satisfaction is below a certain threshold and 1 if it above this threshold. One pos-sibility to code this binary variable is to take the sample mean as breaking point (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) . This proceeding, however, leads to a huge loss of data. To avoid this, we use an approach introduced by Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and also applied by Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) , creating an individual mean satisfaction level for each individual to use it as threshold. This oers the possibility to get consistent results with the xed-eects logit estimator while preventing a large-scale loss of observations.
To derive causal eects of changing jobs, we rely on the information about the reason of leaving the former employer: exogenous company closing. We perform estimations in two dierent models. In the rst step, we do not account for the reason to leave a job but consider all changers pooled together, only dierentiating between downchangers, job changers to an educational match and changers into unemployment.
This gives a rst hint at the direction of the results, without direct causality.
In a second step, we further disaggregate observations by the reasons to change jobs: exogenous and endogenous reasons. Exogenous changes are those due to company closure while we code all others as internal. this decreases the number of observations in each group but allows us to identify causality. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009 . Table 3 presents the results of the linear xed-eects regressions not dierentiating between reasons of change. The rst column shows the coecients for the pooled sample, the second (males) and the third (females) are dierentiated by sex. Coe-cients for the pooled sample are of expected sign and magnitude. A downchange has a negative coecient, which is weakly signicant. A job change into a good t has a positive coecient while a huge negative coecient is observed for entering unemployment. The split gender samples show that the negative downchange coecient is mainly driven by males, where we observe a large (-0.099) and signicant coecient.
Results

General Results
The coecient for females is also negative, but smaller and insignicant while the negative impact of becoming unemployed is found to be similar for both men and women. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. A better insight into the mechanisms at work is achieved by an even further split of the groups to observe the reason for a change. Table 4 shows the results of the linear xed-eects regressions dierentiating between reasons of change. The pooled sample shows that a downchange for reasons other than a company closure is not signicant. This is not unexpected, as a downchange might still be a voluntary move and for some unobserved reasons, these persons are willing to accept it. These reasons might be driven by a need for any job change or simply low ambition levels.
The coecient on entering unemployment for other reasons is still large and significant, meeting our priors, as unemployment is known as one of the worst negative shocks a person can experience in terms of life satisfaction (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1994) . Not surprisingly, a voluntary job change has a positive and signicant eect.
The three following rows show the results for exogenous changes. An exogenous downchange, moving to a bad job after company closing, has a very large negative eect on a person's life satisfaction (-0.231). The coecient is signicant at the 10% level (or single-tailed 5%). The entering unemployment coecient is even larger (-0.474) and the largest negative shock we observe, a nding consistent with the re-sults of Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) . Comparing the point estimates of downchange and moving into unemployment shows that the downchange negative shock is approximately half the size of an entry into unemployment. The coecient for a job change with a good t is insignicant.
The male subsample shows that the combined gender downchange results are mainly driven by men. The coecients for exogenous downchanges are larger than in the pooled sample (-0.328) and the dierence to entering unemployment (-0.525) even becomes smaller. Comparing the point estimates shows that a downchange is even 60% as bad as entering into unemployment. When taking the standard errors into account, it becomes obvious that the coecients are not statistically dierent from each other, so it cannot even be clearly stated that becoming unemployed after a rm closure is worse than downchanging. For the female sample, the coecients of external unemployment and external downchange are smaller and downchange becomes insignicant. This is potentially due to the higher importance placed on labor market outcomes for males, as indicated by the sample descriptives with higher mean values for education and working hours in the male sample.
The results from the linear xed-eects estimations are noticeable. Firstly, unemployment has a huge negative impact on individual happiness. Moving into unemployment after a company closure is the strongest negative event we observe, a result which has been previously found (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1994; Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009 ). However, we show that this is not the only group heavily aected by a rm closure. People staying in employment but going to a job with a bad skill match are comparably worse o. Estimates for males changing down show that the point estimate has about two thirds the size of the entry-unemployment coecient and the coecients cannot be told apart statistically. Hence, we observe a large hit to respondents' satisfaction levels and this observation is highly relevant as it shows the total" costs of company closures are much higher than simple replacement rate.
In a second step of the analysis, we check the validity of these results by applying a xed-eects conditional logit estimator (Chamberlain, 1980) , which is often used in the life satisfaction literature to avoid the assumption of linearity (see e.g. Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Kind and Haisken-DeNew, 2012) . Table 5 shows the results of the general regressions and the picture observed for the linear model remains unchanged. While the coecients from this model may not be interpreted as marginal eects, the general pattern can be observed. Downchange remains negative and signicant for men, while it is insignicant for women. Becoming unemployed remains the worst labor market 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009 shock to be experienced. Moving jobs to a good match has positive coecients. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009 . Table 6 shows the conditional logit results for the split case and it can again be stated that ndings remain stable. There are large, negatively signicant eects for unemployment (both exogenous and for other reasons), as well as a negative eect for downchanging due to company closure, which is highly signicant in the male sample. For both specications, including the reasons for the change or not, results are qualitatively equal to those of the linear regressions.
Applying a non linear model controlling for personal xed-eects, we can verify the results of the linear regressions. As the results do not depend on the choice of the estimator, the interpretation is based on the results of the linear model as they allow an interpretation of the coecients in terms of size.
Robustness Checks
One aspect that has not been considered in the analysis thus far is the aspect of job security. It might be that employees prefer more secure but poorly matched jobs to well-matched but insecure ones. Thus we include a variable controlling for this. 5 Table 7 and Table 8 (see Appendix) present the results of the linear xed-eects regressions. In accordance with the theoretical expectations, the dummy indicating high job security itself is positive, large in size (about 0.21 for males and 0.18 for females, respectively) and statistically signicant at the 1% level. At the same time, the coecients of the other variables remain unchanged in terms of quality and quantity. This is true for the simple inclusion of the security dummy as well as for interactions with downchange (see Table 9 and Table 10 in the Appendix). As a last control, we include the rst lag of the variables of interest (see Table 11 and Table 12 in the Appendix). The results show that a downchange is a one-time negative shock and respondents do not continue to suer for several years, as they do by unemployment.
Implications
Comparing the negative coecient of a downchange to the positive coecient of log household income reveals the strength of the eects found here.
6
In the pooled sample, the eect of an involuntary downchange is about two thirds of the eect of one log point in household income. The mean log household income in our sample is 7.89, which is about e2,650. An increase in a log point at this reference point means an increase of e4,500. Hence to be compensated for the case of an involuntary downchange, one has to be compensated with about e3,000 of additional monthly household income. The analysis demonstrates that although not many individuals are aected by this negative shock, the welfare loss is nevertheless quite large, as indicated by the counterfactual compensating nancial payment that would have to be made to keep the person at the same level of welfare (e3,000 × 12 months = e36,000). People becoming unemployed, for which ever reasons, are paid unemployment benets as well as measures which help them to reintegrate themselves into the labor market. Down-changers are a group of people who behave in a way that is desirable for society as they move to a new job although this does not meet their skills and thereby prevent the payment of assistance. However, they still suer heavily from this move. As there is a small group that suers from a strong shock to their personal satisfaction level, assistance payments limited to a 12 month period may be an inducement to take a worse job match, but avoid the even higher psychic and scal costs of full-blown unemployment.
Conclusion
This paper clearly demonstrates the large and signicant causal eects of underemployment through overeducation on individual welfare levels. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we show that welfare losses due to entry into unemployment are substantial, conrming the established literature. However, remaining in employment, but moving into a job in which one's own professional skills are not fully utilized (downchange), is of a similar loss in welfare as entry into unemployment.
Controlling for the reason of a job change, we identify individuals changing jobs due to exogenous company closure. Here the causal welfare loss due to downchange is as negative in magnitude as full-blown entry into unemployment. A downchanger would have to be compensated by an additional e3000 of monthly household income for one year to allow him to remain at the same level of welfare, as measured by life satisfaction. Of course, no employment benet system is going to be able to nance such a large benet for working recipients, but the idea is clear. Downchanging is a negative phenomenon observed in the labor market, which has thus far been neglected in papers such as Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) , Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009), Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, and Diener (2004) and in the political and economic discussion of lay-os. As the psychic costs are similar in magnitude for the worker who exogenously lost his job through plant closing and who (a) enters into standard unemployment or (b) nds a job in which the skill match is imperfect, but the scal costs are avoided, there is a role for policy to play in this case. In case (a), the worker suers a welfare loss, works zero hours, yet receives unemployment payments and in (b), the worker earns a wage and receives no benets. To socialize the private welfare loss and avoid giving any incentive to enter into unemployment and take the payments, some targeted smaller benet could be granted in cases of bona de plant closures, to oset the downchange welfare loss and keep the aected workers earning and contributing to the social security system, instead of drawing from it. The benet would be some amount, up to the dierence between previous wages in the closed plant and the current wage (if lower) and paid, once the new job has started and the duties performed or skills required veried. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 1994 -1998; 2001 -2007; 2009. 
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